Electric Power Markets

Background, Regulation, and Deregulation

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Electricity Intro: Overview of next few lectures

- Today: Overview of technology and core engineering constraints.
- Next class: Regulation and Deregulation.
- Next week: Electricity market game.

Background

Electric power makes up 40% of US energy demand





Most electric power generators driven by a turbine



Source: EIA

Coal fired power plant



- Average plant is around 600 MW
- C02 emissions of 2.25 lbs per kWh
- Source and more info here.

Natural gas power plant



- Average plant is around 300-500 MW
- C02 emissions of 0.91 lbs per kWh. Less than half coal. But extracting natural gas releases methane.
- Source and more info here.

Nuclear power plant



- Average plant is around 2,000 MW
- Even when designed and run well, can still impose massive social costs (Fukushima)
- Waste needs to be stored / processed
- Source and more info here.

Hydroelectric power plant



- Sizes varies a lot.
- Large plants can be very ecologically disruptive.
- Source and more info here.

Wind turbines

- Average turbine around 3 MW.
- Offshore turbines of 20 MW on the horizon.

Solar thermal plant





Solar photovoltaic (PV) is the exception



Average residential system is 0.005 MW


U.S. electricity generation by major energy source, 1950-2020
billion kilowatthours
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
petroleum and other
renewables
nuclear
natural gas
coal
Note: Electricity generation from utility-scale facilities.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Monthly Energy Review*, Table 7.2a, January 2021 and *Electric Power Monthly*, February 2021, preliminary data for 2020



Note: Electricity generation from utility-scale facilities. Hydroelectric is conventional hydropower.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Monthly Energy Review*, Table 7.2a, January 2021 and *Electric Power Monthly*, February 2021, preliminary data for 2020

Questions

Why do we use a mix of technologies?

Can we switch entirely to wind and solar?

Some terminology: Watts vs watt-hours

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  - Avg US household consumes 10,000,000 Wh per year.
- Common units of aggregation are **kilowatt-hours** (kWh = 1000 Wh) and **megawatt-hours** (MWh = 1,000,000 Wh)

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- Common units of aggregation are **kilowatt-hours** (kWh = 1000 Wh) and **megawatt-hours** (MWh = 1,000,000 Wh)
- The **capacity** of a power plant in is denoted in megawatts (MW). This is the amount of power it can produce when operating optimally at any moment.
- If a 1 MW plant operates optimally for 1 hour, it creates 1 megawatt-hour of electricity (MWh).
  - This would power approximately 800 homes.

Power production involves both fixed cost (per MW) and variable costs (per MWh)



Which technology is cheapest?

If a plant has capital cost K and variable cost v, and it runs for q hours, it's total lifetime cost C is

$$C = K + v * q$$

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$$C = K + v * q$$

Dividing by q we get the average cost per unity of electricity over the life of the asset, called the **Levelized Cost of Energy** (LCOE)

$$LCOE = K/q + v$$

[note typically we want to discount]

This is the minimum average price the plant must be paid in order to cover costs.

Which energy tech is "cheapest"?

The answer depends on how often the asset will be used.



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

Why do we have *any* gas plants?
Why build something that only runs half the time?

Overview of electric power systems



Source: Wikipedia

Key points

- Power plants often located far a way
- Transmitting lots of power require high voltage (dangerous)
- Needs to be "stepped down" to lower voltage to get to customers.


Western Interconnection
Includes El Paso and Far West Texas
Eastern Interconnection
Includes portions of East Texas and the Panhandle region
ERCOT Interconnection

Electricity different from other goods

Electricity different from other goods

- Generators don't create electrons, they send waves across existing electrons on the grid
  - Flow reverberates to balance differences in potential energy across nodes (Kirchoff's law)
- Analogy: Electricity like a pond where demanders draw water, suppliers put more in
  - Cannot track "electricity" across the grid
  - From consumer's perspective, electricity generation is totally undifferentiated (ie it does not matter how it was produced)

Challenge: Supply and demand have to balance perfectly at every point in space and time

- Too much supply/ too little demand causes the frequency to increase.
  - Our appliances are designed to expect a very specific voltage. Even minor deviations can damage them.
  - Large deviations can cause explosions and fires on grid equipment.
  - Implication: Can't just bring more power unless you know someone wants it.

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- Too little supply/ too much demand and the frequency drops.
  - This can lead to a blackout, which precludes *anyone* from consuming electricity.
  - Contrast that with a typical market (Avocado example)
  - Implications: In order for someone to increase electricity use, a power plant has to concurrently increase supply.

The 2003 Northeast Blackout, 10 Years Later (PHOTOS)

08/14/2013 08:14 am ET | **Updated** Dec 06, 2017

A decade ago today, more than 50 million people lost power during the great Northeast Blackout of 2003. An aging electrical grid, a series of technology flaws and a few overgrown trees led to a cascading series of outages stretching from New York City to Ohio and up into Ontario, Canada.

Source: HuffPo

Balancing supply and demand is nontrivial because demand varies considerably across time

- When do you think we use more electricity over the course of a day? Year?

Example from New England



At any given point in time, the lowest **marginal costs** firms supply power first



Source: EIA

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

Source: EIA

This means that somewhere in each grid, there is a plant that only produces power during the highest demand (likely hottest) hour of the year.

Trillion dollar question: Why don't we just store energy?

- Many markets have varying demand and a small number of large efficient firms (ie ice cream)

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- Many markets have varying demand and a small number of large efficient firms (ie ice cream)
- Challenge: electricity is very expensive to store.
- What were some ways considered in the Planet Money episode?

This (not cost) is currently the biggest impediment to wind and solar



Source: EIA

Wind is particularly challenging because it is less predictable



Source: EIA

Another issue: How fast can the asset get moving?

Table 5.2: Typical ramp and run times for power plants.

Technology	Ramp Time	Min. Run Time
Simple-cycle combustion turbine	minutes to hours	minutes
Combined-cycle combustion turbine	hours	hours to days
Nuclear	days	weeks to months
Wind Turbine (includes offshore wind)	minutes	none
Hydroelectric (includes pumped storage)	minutes	none

Source: PSU

The combination of demand and supply variation, ramp up times and no storage means that spot electricity prices are often negative!



Source: EnelX

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

Source: EnelX

This says if you could just store electricity a couple of hours, someone in CA would pay you $10 to take it at 3 PM, and then someone else would buy it off you for $35 at 6 PM.

Lecture 1: Summary

- Many different ways to produce electricity. Important differences:
  - Costs, fixed vs variable
  - Externalities
  - "dispatchability" – agility and predictability.
- Electric power delivery system generates some unique market features
  - No straight line between supply and demand.
  - System has to perfectly balance
- Cheap storage would massively simplify this system, and probably obviate some generation types.

Vertical Integration and Regulation

Overview of electric power regulation

Goals:

1. Keep the lights on! (avoid blackouts)
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Long run - Want to build capacity mix that matches demand patterns as closely as possible.

Short run - Make sure the cheapest options produce power every hour.

Industry thought to be a *natural monopoly*

What makes a natural monopoly?

- Declining long run average costs (LRAC)
  - non increasing long run marginal costs (LRMC)
- What generates this?
  - Large fixed costs
  - Economies of scale
- Implies that it is always cheaper to produce with a single firm
- The complexity of the grid was another justification for vertical integration / natural monopoly.

How to fix the monopoly problem?

- Natural monopoly: a single firm can produce cheaper than many firms
- However, a single firm also has the ability to exert market power, undermining these cost efficiencies

How should the government balance the cost savings and market power concerns?

- One option is to have the government simply run operations
  - ie USPS

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  - How did this work?

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- One option is to have the government simply run operations
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- In US electricity, a "regulation" system was preferred
  - How did this work?
  - monopoly utilities would make investments in generation and supply power
  - the regulator would set price they could charge such that they earned a "fair" return on these investments

Traditional rate of return regulation

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- Let power plants be indexed by i. With capital costs k_i, variable costs v_i and production q_i.
- The regulator allows the utility to set prices that fully recover its variable expenses $v * q$, as well as a "fair" rate of return (s) on capital investment K,

$$Revenue = \sum_i v_i q_i + s \sum_i k_i$$

What are some concerns with this system?

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$$\text{Profit} = \text{Revenue - Cost} = \text{Cost} + sK - \text{Cost}$$

- need to know Q
- Expenses may change in between rate cases
- **Provides no incentive to be efficient**
- **Biases firms towards accumulating capital**

Problem 1: Given installed capital, firm has no incentive to be efficient

- What are the firm's short run business decisions here?
  - Every hour, it has to forecast demand, and make sure the right (cheapest) generators are ready to produce.
  - These are large complicated pieces of equipment, need to be well maintained and managed.
  - What are the firm's incentives to do a good at these things?

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- In a competitive market, failure to operate efficiently means you go out of business.
- Here, price is *guaranteed* to cover costs.
  - If they do a bad job, consumers foot the bill.
  - If they do a good job, regulator takes the savings and gives it to customers.
- This gives regulated firms no incentive to reduce costs

Problem 2: In the long run, firms install the wrong type of capital.

Remember, there are two important costs here: capital costs and variable costs.

In a normal market, inputs are selected to minimize the cost of achieving any output

- Revenue produced by combining capital and labor

$$\pi = R(K, L) - wL - rK$$

- Ratio of first order condition for both inputs yields:

$$\frac{\partial R/\partial K}{\partial R/\partial L} = \frac{r}{w}$$

- Inputs are selected such that there marginal product is equal to their marginal cost

Rate of return regulation distorts input choices

- Firms max profits subject to the constrained return on capital

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &= R(K,L) - wL - rK \\ \text{s.t.} \quad \frac{R(K,L)-wL}{K} &= s \end{aligned}$$

- This effectively distorts relative prices

$$\frac{\partial R/\partial K}{\partial R/\partial L} = \frac{r-\alpha}{w}$$

  - where $\alpha = \frac{\lambda(s-r)}{l-\lambda} > 0$
- Since we know the market input mix was efficient, this has to come at a social cost
  - regulation effectively subsidizes building stuff

The Averch-Johnson Effect



Source: VHV ch 12

*Alternative: incentive regulation

- Performance standards
  - encourage (or require) observable performance improvements
  - example: reducing downtime for maintenance
- Earnings sharings
  - Allow firm to keep a share of excess returns if it reduces costs
- Price caps
  - Simply fix the price, allowing firm to keep residual with cost
  - What is potentially problematic about this?
- Yardstick regulation
  - Use other regulated firms (say other states) as a benchmark
  - Reward improvements relative to the benchmark
  - What is challenging about this?
  - If costs decline, so much price

Lecture 2: Regulation Summary

- Due to both large fixed costs and coordination issues, electric power historically run as vertically integrated regulated monopoly.
- The primary objective of this system was to keep the lights on, and it did that quite well.
- But perverse incentives distorted behavior along two dimensions:

  1. Because costs were covered, the utility had no incentive to operation efficiently.
  2. Because returns were tied to capital expenditures, utilities were distorted towards building large expensive plants.

Deregulation

The push for deregulation

- By the 1970's, apparent evidence of regulatory inefficiency was everywhere
    - California had guaranteed a return on many power plants which seemed to be no longer needed.
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  - Large projects, particularly nuclear, cost ratepayers much more than initially promised.
- This sorts of problems are exactly what markets are good at.
- This prompted people to take another look at the electric power grid, and look for ways to infuse competition.

Which parts of the grid can be deregulated?



Transmission and Local Distribution still appear to be natural monopolies

- need regulator to ensure access and fair tariffs

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

Generation: why not let profit seeking entities decide which plants to build and where, and figure out how to run them and when?

- example: air travel

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

Retail also seems possible to deregulate

- encourage market to come up with new ways of procuring and packaging power
- example: cable (?)

Status of deregulation

- Wave of restructuring 1995-2002
- CA electricity crisis 2000-2001 gave everybody pause
- Current situation best described as stasis

Share of merchant generators in 2012



Source: Borenstein and Bushnell (2015)

Share of retail sales from power marketers



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How deregulated generation markets work

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- And Independent System Operator (ISO) is given full control over balancing the grid.
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- Private investors put up (a lot of) capital to build a power plants, at their own risk.
- And Independent System Operator (ISO) is given full control over balancing the grid.
    - Have to approve generation requests.
- Every 15 minutes the ISO holds an auction. Generators tell the ISO the minimum price they'd need to be to produce power for next 15 mins.
- ISO "dispatches" cheapest generators first until demand is satisfied.
- Every generator that produces gets paid the *marginal* (ie highest clearing) bid.



Alberta Electric System Operator
Ontario Independent Electric System Operator
Midcontinent ISO
ISO NewEngland
New York ISO
PJM Interconnection
Southwest Power Pool
California ISO
Electric Reliability Council of Texas

In deregulated markets, firms earn returns by being *inframarginal* in the wholesale market



Why are deregulated wholesale prices so volatile?

One reason cost convexity

Consider a market with three types of technology



How it's supposed to work:

- Plants bid their true MC into the auction
- Cheapest MC plants produce.
- Price to customers is the MC of the last producer

But another problem is market power

What if coal knows its going to be a mild (m) day?



Imagine coal bids right below gas's MC

- Still cheaper than gas.
- Since demand is very inelastic, little change in Q
- But the price is **much** higher

Why is the potential for market power particular severe in electricity markets?

Theory: Lerner index – Monopoly pricing

$$L = \frac{P - MC}{P} = \frac{1}{elasticity}$$

Why is the potential for market power particular severe in electricity markets?

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Incentive to raise price related to demand elasticity



Imagine demand were much more responsive to P

- Raising price now significantly reduces Q.
- Therefor the gains to raising price are much smaller.
- Note many firms own both types of plants....

Case study: California



Initially supply looked plentiful. In 2000, that changed.

California Thermal-Generation Supply Curve

(various months)



In tight conditions, small changes in demand lead to huge changes in prices.

A Shift in Variable Demand in the Electricity Market



Stable consumer bills and volatile input costs

Stable consumer bills and volatile input costs

- How do we avoid enormous price spikes in other markets? When the price spikes, people don't buy. (example: 2019 avocado shortage)
- In electricity, consumers only face the *average* marginal cost of procuring electricity.
- Moreover, there was enormous pressure to keep consumer prices low.
- Result: costs going through the roof, but consumers given no incentive to reduce demand.
- Solution: time varying pricing (will cover this later)

Issue recieving renewed attention after Texas

Texas slaps down $9,000 power prices after blackout chaos

By Edward Klump | 12/03/2021 07:35 AM EST

Comparison

Should deregulation lead to lower prices lead to lower prices than regulated average cost pricing?

[note: details of these on the next slides]

- In any period, marginal cost pricing looks cheap (expensive) when supply is high (low) relative to demand. (?)
- Short run: suspect markets will be better at reducing costs (-)
- But needs to be balanced against the fact that firms now price above marginal cost. (+)
- In long run, no capital bias, so the "right" plants will get built (-)
- Is the return guaranteed by the regulator lower that the average profit earned in deregulated regions?

How prices are computed in each regime

Regulated regions:

- Vertically integrated utility serves demand as it sees fit
- Reports **total costs** and total demand
- Regulator sets long run retail prices equal to the *average* cost plus a fair return

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Deregulated regions

- Wholesale auctions determine which plants get to operate (often every 15 minutes)
- All dispatched plants receive the *marginal* price
    - ie the marginal cost of the most expensive dispatched plants
- Retailers procure power from these auctions to keep the lights on
- Retail prices set to recover the average *auction* price, plus costs of transmission and distribution

Regulation: Average cost pricing

- Let q_{ijh} be the quantity of electricity supplied to consumer i during hour h from generator j
- s_{ij} is the total delivery cost of getting from j to i
  - transmission plus retail
- c_j is the marginal cost of running plant j
- Regulated utility minimizes: $Cost = \sum_{i,j,h}[q_{ijh} \times (s_{ij} + c_j)]$
- Subject to:
  - demand constraint: $\sum_j q_{ijh} \geq q_{ih}$
  - capacity constraint: $\sum_i q_{ijh} \leq \bar{q}_j$
- Price is then set equal to average costs plus return r
  $P_R = Cost / \sum_{i,j,h} q_{ijh} + r$

Deregulation: Marginal cost pricing

- Each period, an auction is held.
- Generators bid the price they'd be willing to accept to supply power to each consumer b_{ijh}
  - can show it's optimal to bid $(s_{ij} + c_j)$
- Marketer dispatches plants until every consumer's demand is met
- Let $\hat{b_{ih}}$ be the maximum bid dispatched each consumer-hour
- All dispatched generators receive maximum bid, not their actual bid
- Consumers then pay the average of these marginal prices each period $P_D = \sum_{ih} \hat{b_{ih}} / \sum_{i,j,h} q_{ijh}$

Backup

EXTRA MATERIAL

Review: Efficiency loss from monopoly power

- Demand: $P = A - bQ$
- Constant marginal costs c
- Profit $\pi = Q * P - Q * c$

Competitive outcome:

- firms take prices as given
- FOC:

$$\begin{aligned} d\pi/dQ &= 0 \\ P &= c \\ A - bQ &= c \end{aligned}$$

$Q^* = \frac{A-c}{b}$

Review: Efficiency loss from monopoly power

Monopoly outcome:

- firm treats P as function of Q
  - $\pi = Q(A - bQ) - Qc$
- FOC:

$$\begin{aligned} d\pi/dQ &= 0 \\ A - 2bQ &= c \end{aligned}$$

$Q^M = \frac{A-c}{2b}$

Two effects of market power

1. Monopoly price is higher than marginal cost:
   - so conditional on still purchasing, consumers get smaller surplus
   - this is a distributional issue
2. Monopoly quantity is too low
   - too few people get the good
   - this is an efficiency issue (DWL)

What determines the size of these effects?

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What determines the size of these effects? Lerner index:

$$L = \frac{P - MC}{P} = \frac{1}{elasticity}$$


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D
T
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Losses
S
P_0
MC
D
0
Q_0

Alternative: Nonlinear pricing

- Instead of just charging P, also charge customers a fixed fee
  - ie F = losses/ # of customers
  - P = MC per unit
- This is a two-part tariff
- What are some problems with this approach?

Alternative: Nonlinear pricing

- Instead of just charging P, also charge customers a fixed fee
  - ie F = losses/ # of customers
  - P = MC per unit
- This is a two-part tariff
- What are some problems with this approach?
  - consumers could leave market
  - not equitable
- One solution is different schedules for different types of consumers
  - will come back to this later